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FIRM R&D GAMES WITH DIFFERING MANUFACTURING COSTS
Jannett Highfill, B radley University
Michael McAsey, Bradley University

The paper considers an industry where competition is characterized as a two-stage game between the two firms in which
the product reliabilities are determined before the (Coumot) quantities. Reliability is determined by R&D expenditure.
The focus is on how competitive conditions in terms of manufacturing costs affect tlte firms' decision about optimal
reliability. The main result of the paper is that the firm with lower manufacturing cost produces a more reliable product.
However a reduction in a given firm 's manufacturillg cost only causes it to produce a more reliable product when the
diff erence in costs between finns is low. Comparative static exercises suggest that reliability generally increases when
customers have a higher reservation price for the product and a lower customer cost of product f ailure.
Research and development strategies are key to
profitability for many firms. While R&D expenditures can
affect the firm in many ways, the present paper focuses on
the situation when R&D spending is used to increase the
reliability of a firm' s product. Consider an industry where
competition is characterized as a two-stage game between
the two firms in which the product reliabilities are
determined before the (Cournot) quantities. Reliability is
determined by R&D expenditure. The focus of the present
paper is on how competitive conditions (in terms of
manufacturing costs) affect the firms' decision about optimal
reliability.
The paper is theoretical, the model having many formal
similarities with the R&D/quality literature where quality is
chosen first and then quantities are chosen in a Cournot-type
game; see Neary and Leahy (2000), Jinji and Toshirnitsu
(2006), DeCourcy (2005), Haaland and Kind (2008, 2006),
and Gretz, Highfill, and Scott (2009). These papers differ
from the present paper in that their focus is on whether R&D
should be subsidized rather than on the product quality
(reliability) itself as the present paper does. With the
exception of DeCourcy (2005), all of these papers essentially
argue that R&D should be subsidized either because firms'
decision making ignores aspects of social surplus like
consumer surplus, (Jinji and Tosbimitsu (2006), Haaland and
Kind (2008, 2006), and Gretz, Highfill, and Scott (2009)) or
intra-firm spillovers (Neary and Leahy (2000)). DeCourcy
(2005), on the other hand, argues that allowing research
cooperation between competing firms is superior to any
subsidy policy.
The present paper draws particularly on Highfill and
McAsey (2010) except that while the present paper neglects
its dynamic considerations, reliabilities are endogenous for
both firms as they were not in that paper. The present paper
relies on numerical analysis of the theoretical model.
The main result of the paper is that the firm with lower
manufacturing cost produces a more reliable product.
However this only holds when the difference in costs
between firms is small. Comparative static exercises suggest
that reliability generally increases when customers have a
higher reservation price for the product and a lower

customer cost of product failure. (The exception is noted
below.)

THE MODEL
Suppose there is a distribution of customer reservation
prices for a perfect product where the reservation price is the
highest price a potential customer is willing to pay for a
perfect product. Reservation prices are assumed to be
uniformly distributed on the interval (W, V) . That is, w is
the minimum reservation price for the product and is the
maximum reservation price. Customers are indifferent
between the products of the two firms when products are
perfectly reliable (in which case the two firms will charge
the same price). These distributional demand assumptions
are similar to Herguera and Lutz (2003) and Gretz, Highfill,
and Scott (2009); Haaland and Kind (2008, 2006) arrive at a
similar (linear) derived demand function by assuming a
quadratic utility function, while DeCourcy (2005),
d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (I 988), Brod and Shivakumar
(1997), and Greenlee (2005) forthrightly assume linear
demand with no income effects. For the ease of readers the
present paper reviews the model setup of Highfill and
McAsey (2010) with the exceptions noted above.
Our measure of product reliability is the probability
that a product is judged by the customer to be of acceptable
quality; this probability is denoted R, for firms i =1, 2 . This
notion of quality as product reliability (or the related concept
of product failure) can be found in Daughety and Reinganum
(1995), Gretz, Highfill, and Scotl (2009), and Matthews and
Moore (1987). Product failure imposes costs on the
customer that are not reimbursed by the finn. This " cost to
customers" of product failure is the parameter K , so the
"expected cost of product failure" for a customer purchasing
from the i

1

h

firm is (1- R.)K since (1- R1 ) is the probability

of product failure . Customers know the probability that any
arbitrary unit will fail, but not whether the particular unit
they purchase will fail. Customers whose reservation price
v satisfies the following condition will purchase the
product:
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the total manufacturing costs arc e,Q, because the

v~~+(l-~)K =~ +(1-R.z)K
(1)
where ~ is the purchase price of the product from firmi.

manufacturing cost of the original units is me, Q,; the

Customers are risk neutral in the sense that their buying
decisions arc based on price and expected customer cost of
product failuie. The expression P, +(I - R,)K is conveniently

is(l-R.)me,Q,, where (1- R,)Q, is the expected number of

(expected) cost of replacing or repairing the defective units

called the "full quality price." While in general the firms'
costs, qualities, and prices are not the same, for both firms to
have positive sales it must be the case that the full quality
price is the same for both firms. If this were not the case,
customers would only buy from the fum with the lower full
quality price. These assumptions imply linear demand
functions N for the product
~ = V-(1-RJK- v~w (Ql+Qz)
( 2)
where N is the potential market size and Q, is the quantity
demanded of firm i's product.
Improvements in quality require research and
development; the expenditure on R&D is E, ~ 0 for firm L
Assume that such expenditure produces an improvement in
the reliability of the firm's product, but is subject to
diminishing marginal returns. Specifically,
E, = k(R, - R,0 ) 2
(3)
wherek > 0, and defining o:SR,o :SJ as the "default
reliabi!jty" that wou1d occur in the absence of any R&D
expenditure. The assumption of a quadratic relationship
between quality improvement and R&D spending which is
independent of the quantity produced is found in Brod and
Shivakumar ( 1997), d •Aspremont and Jacquemin ( 198 8),
Greenlee (2005), Herguera and Lutz (2003), Haaland and
Kind (2006, 2008) and Gretz, Highfill, and Scott (2009).
Recall that RI is a probability and so is between zero and

defective units.
Firm profits can now be defined as

n , =(F:-e,)Q,- E,

(5)

recalling equations (2)-(4). The fums play a two-stage game
where the product reliabilities are determined before the
(Coumot) quantities. Solutions are computed using
generalized bacl-ward induction. Therefore, the quantity
decisions are computed by solving the first order conditions
(an, 1aQ, =O). The results are substituted back into the
objective function and the reliabilities found by solving the
first order conditions (an, 1oR, = O). The parameter values
for the numerical results that follow are
v =200, W=100, K =100, IJG = 100, and k=l50.cxx:l·
Thinking about the demand curve first, notice that with
these parameters the range of reservation prices is 100, the
range being moved up the axis so that the minimum
reservation price is not zero. There is nothing special about
the choice of 100, we just wanted the same order of
magnitude for all parameters, except for k which as
mentioned above needs to be orders of magnitude
larger. This exact value of k was chosen so that the
reliabilities seem reasonable; that is, in the range between
90% and 100%. The focus of this paper is on manufacturing
costs and so the graphs reported in the next section serve as
a kind a sensitivity analysis for dillering relationships
between the manufacturing costs o f the two firms. See the
discussion below. Although not reported here for brevity,
we have done the same analysis fo r 111~ = 90 and

one, while the expenditure on R&D is typically rather large
and certainly never less than one. Therefore the constant k
needs to reduce R&D expenditures by several orders of
magnitude and is typically a large number. Finally, although
for the sake of simplicity we refer to E, as R&D

e =110 getting results substantially similar to Figures 1-4.

111 1

TH E RELATIONSHIP
OF
RELIABILIT Y T O
MANUFACTURING COST ADVANTAGE

expenditure, it is really the component of expenditure which
varies with reliability. There would normally be many
fixed-cost R&D expenditures.
In addition to R&D costs, each firm has a per unit
manufacturing cost of111c. lt is assumed that the units of the

The focus of the present paper is on differences in
marginal costs between firms. Suppose now that the
marginal cost for firm 1 is simply me; =100 . Define

product that fail are returned by lhc customer and replaced
(or if repaired that the repair cost is the same as the
replacement cost). Thus defining
(4)
c, =me,+(1- R;)me,

That is, firm 2's costs are greater than firm 1's if and only if
the "marginal cost ratio'' PIK: > l· The relationship between

.a! cost rauo=
. !5. =Pw-·
margm

me1

'

the marginal cost ratio parameter and firm reliabilities is
shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE!
Reliabilities as a F unction of the Marginal Cost Ratio
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FIGURE !
Reliabilities as a Function of the Marginal Cost Ratio
Reliability
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To interpret Figure I, note that the solution of the firm's
game is a function of PMc . The manufacturing costs for firm

From the numerical example above notice that on the right

1 arc held constant the manufacturing costs for firm 2 vary.
Figure 1 and all the figures to follow essentially report
comparative static results. When, for example, p 11c =.5 ,

above fi rm l 's, while on the left it is below. Algebraically,
thjs is
>me,. PMc > 1
me; + m~
2
me,
2
{ <me; , PMt <l

firm 2 bas the manufacturing cost advantage with a
manufacturing cost of 50 dollars per unit as compared to
firm I 's manufacturing cost of 100 do liars per unit. When
p,1, = 2, on the other hand firm 2 has a manufacturing cost

side of

When the average is ·'rugh" (the right hand side of the
figure) an increase firm 1's manufacturing cost advantage
(i.e., an increase in the marginal cost ratio) causes the two
reliabilities to diverge more than they would if tbe curves
were Linear. When the average is "low" (on the left) an
increase in firm 2's manufacturing cost advantage (a
decrease in the marginal cost ratio) causes the reliabilities to
also diverge, but less than they would if the curves were
linear.
The results reported in Figure L will be called the "base..
case. The next three figures arc also comparative static
experiments. They explore tbe effect on reliability of
changing the marginal cost ratio and one other parameter. In
the figures that follow the base case is the solid line; the
effect of the change in the parameter of interest is shown by
a dashed line.

of 200 dollars per unit. Thus the right side of the figure
advantage while the left ( p~1t < 1) is when firm 2 has the
PMt = 1

the average of the two manufacturing costs is

(1+ Pw:)

( p~11 > 1) is when fum 1 has the manufacturing cost

manufacturing cost advantage. At

PMc = 1

the manufacturing

costs are the same and reliabilities are the same. For short
hand we will say that on the right, firm 1 has a
manufacturing cost advantage or simply a cost advantage; on
the left, firm 2 has the cost advantage.
The first result of the paper is that the firm with the
manufacturing cost advantage will produce a higher quality
product. Noticing that the R 1 curve is concave up (barely)
and the R2 concave down, a change in the marginal cost ratio
has a "more than linear" effect on the two reliabilities.
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FIGURE2
Reliabilities as a Function of the Marginal Cost Ratio: Customer Valuation
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range is from W=50 to V=150 dollars. These results suggest
that as customers value the product less firms respond by
producing a less reliable product.

Figure 2 shows the effects of a reduction in the value
that customers place on the product. Specifically, while in
the base case the range of reservation prices was from
W=lOO to V=200 dollars. in the "low" case ofFigure 2 the

FIGURE3
Reliabilities as a Function of the Marginal Cost Ratio: Customer Cost of Failure
Reliability
1.00

firm 2 when its manufacturing costs are quite high. (The

Figure 3 shows the effect of a reduction in the customer
cost of product failure from K=I 00 dollars in the base case
to K=50 dollars. Generally, as customers are less damaged
by product failure firms respond by producing a lower
quality product. But notice the anomaly of the reliability of

Rz

curves actually intersect.) Future work might further
investigate this result.
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FIGURE4
Reliabilities as a Function of the Marginal Cost Ratio: Absolute Costs
Reliability
1.00

0.98

0.%

-----.. ----- --·
....
The interpretation of Figure 4 is slightly tricky. The
question is: what happens if the marginal manufacturing
costs change? The base case (solid lines) is as explained
above. The dashed lines change the marginal manufacturing
cost of fim1 1 to 50 dollars. Thus for example, when
PwC" = .5 in the base case n!(; =100 and mc2 =SO. For the

CO NCLUSION

The theoretical exercise of the present paper considers
the effects ofmanufaeturing cost advantage on a ftrm 's
R&D expenditures, or equivalently in our model, on the
quality of the product. The predictions of our analysis are
sometimes straightforward. The firm with the
manufacturing cost advantage will produce the more reliable
product. But some of the predictions of the model are not so
simple. It is not necessarily the case that a reduction in a
given finn's manufacturing cost will cause it to produce a
higher quality product. There is a sense in which a profit
maximizing firm sometimes will take advantage of a
reduction in its own manufacturing cost by actually doing
less R&D- and thus producing a lower quality product.

dashed lines, at the same P.llc = .5 now me; = 50 and mc2 = 25.
For all marginal cost ratios, lower overall manufacturing
costs (dashed lines) lead to a smaller difference in
reliabilities between firms reliabilities as compared to the
base case. Further, considering tile marginal cost ratios
"near'' PMr = 1 both firm's reliabilities are higher than in the
base case. As long as the f~rms' manufactming costs are
"similar" (i.e., p MC .,1) lower overall costs lead to higher
reliabilities. But when the marginal cost ratios are "farther''
from p - 1 the firm with the cost advantage has a higher
'" reliability with the lower absolute costs. For example, on
the far right where firm 1 has a larger cost advantage the
reliability when its costs are low (the dashed line) is actually
lower than for the base case. While on the far right dashed
line for firm 2 is higher than the solid line of the base case.
So when finns· manufactW'ing costs are very dissimilar, a
reduction in its own marginal cost (dashed line compared to
solid on the far right) leads the firm with the cost advantage
to optimally produce a less reliable product. ln summary, a
reduction in a given firm's manufacturing cost only causes it
to produce a more reliable product when the difference in
costs between fums is low. When the difference in costs is
high a firm with a manufacturing cost advantage will use a
reduc6on in its marginal cost as the occasion to actually
produce a Jess reliable product.
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